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COMPETING WITH NONCOMPETES:
INCREASING RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF
EMPLOYMENT NONCOMPETITION
AGREEMENTS IN NEW YORK
ABSTRACT
The New York City Council and the former New York State Attorney
General recently proposed legislation restricting the use of noncompetition
agreements by employers with low-wage employees. While this proposed
legislation demonstrates a step following other progressive states that have
already restricted the use of noncompetition agreements, recent federal
litigation has revealed the loopholes that New York employers may unfairly
utilize, such as garden leave provisions, if restrictions are not placed on
both employers of low-wage and high-wage employees. This Note
recommends that pending legislation be passed only after a thorough
revision that focuses on both low-wage and high-wage employees to
maximize employee flexibility and establish and maintain a fair employment
standard throughout the entire state of New York.
INTRODUCTION
New York State, while not as progressive as California and other states,
has begun following the trend in considering and enforcing greater
restrictions on noncompetition agreements (or “noncompetes”). 1 This Note
will discuss the increased restrictions, in force and proposed, by New York
courts and legislatures over the past few years as both the federal
government and state legislatures collectively begin further restricting
noncompetition agreements throughout the country.
Restrictive covenants in employment agreements, especially
noncompetition agreements, can be critical to a company’s “bottom line.” 2
Noncompetition agreements are written contracts that employers often use
to stop employees from working for a competing employer for a certain
period of time after leaving employment. 3 Although employers cannot
require prospective employees to sign noncompetes, an employer may

1. Eve Klein, United States: New York Developments Continue Trend Against NonCompetition
and
Non-Solicitation
Agreements,
MONDAQ
(Aug.
31,
2017),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/625152/Contract+of+Employment/New+York+Developm
ents+Continue+Trend+Against+NonCompetition+And+NonSolicitation+Agreements.
2. Braden Campbell, 5 New Noncompete Developments Attys Should Know About, LAW360
(Aug. 11, 2016, 3:32 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/953214/5-new-noncompetedevelopments-attys-should-know-about.
3. Ryan Burke, What You Need to Know About Non-Compete Agreements, and How States
are Responding, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE (May 5, 2016, 11:16 AM), https://obamaw
hitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/05/05/what-you-need-know-about-non-compete-agreements-an
d-how-states-are-responding.
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terminate or not hire a prospective employee who declines to comply. 4 Such
restrictive covenants are most frequently incorporated into employment
agreements that are provided by an employer and executed by an employee
at the outset of the employment relationship. 5 The rationale behind using
noncompetes is to “encourage innovation” by preventing employees, who
may have access to trade secrets, from taking information and intellectual
property owned by an employer and bringing it and/or using it for a rival
business. 6 Noncompetes are often given little attention, if at all, during the
initial stage of an employment relationship, and if they are, employers
typically consider them to be “inviolable” while employees consider them
to be “unenforceable.” 7 Due to this limited attention, noncompetes often
become a major obstacle during departure negotiations at the end of an
employment relationship and are increasingly becoming a subject of
litigation. 8 Since 2000, noncompete and trade secret lawsuits have nearly
tripled. 9
The recent federal case, In re Document Technologies Litigation, shows
the latest restrictions on noncompetition agreements in New York State. 10
In this case, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that employees of a business may prepare to compete with
another business during the term of a noncompete. 11 The rationale behind
the district court’s decision in this case paralleled similar outcomes in
recent investigations of employers by the former New York Attorney
General, as well as proposed legislation by both New York State and New
York City. However, the district court in In re Document Technologies
Litigation should have tightened restrictions on noncompetition agreements
even further if it wished to pave the way for increased restrictions on all
noncompetition agreements throughout the state rather than allow for such
agreements to still be enforced upon high-wage employees. Additionally, if
and when New York State and New York City adopt proposed legislation
regarding noncompetition agreements, the legislatures should include
restrictions on noncompetition agreements for high-wage employees to
further the state’s policy of maximizing employment flexibility and
4. See Your Rights Non-Compete Agreements, WORKPLACE FAIRNESS,
https://www.workplacefairness.org/non-compete-agreements (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).
5. Sheryl B. Galler, Restrictive Covenants: Limits and Enforcement, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N
2 (Mar. 10, 2013), https://www.nysba.org/Sections/Labor_and_Employment/Labor_PDFs/
LaborMeetingsAssets/Galler.html.
6. Burke, supra note 3.
7. Galler, supra note 5, at 2.
8. Id.
9. Conor Dougherty, How Noncompete Clauses Keep Workers Locked In, N. Y. TIMES (May
13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/business/noncompete-clauses.html.
10. See generally In re Document Techs. Litig., 275 F. Supp. 3d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding
that an employee “may prepare to compete during the term of a noncompete provision”) (internal
citation omitted).
11. Klein, supra note 1.
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eliminating the need to use loopholes to leave an employee, such as taking a
“garden leave” 12 and receiving payment incentives, both of which were
present and allowed in In re Document Technologies Litigation. 13 Not all
employees are able to receive such options, and many smaller businesses
are unable to provide for such incentives when seeking new employees with
potential noncompetition restrictions. As a result, an employee’s ability to
leave an employer for a better opportunity elsewhere relies on factors
beyond the employee’s control.
Part I of this Note discusses the background of recent enforcement
history of noncompetition agreements throughout the United States. Part II
explores New York State and New York City law governing
noncompetition agreements and recent updates pertaining to the use of such
agreements in New York. Part III presents the recent case, In re Document
Technologies Litigation, which further develops New York law governing
noncompetition agreements. Part IV analyzes the implications of the district
court’s decision in In re Document Technologies Litigation on the future of
noncompetition law in New York. Part V presents a solution, through a
stronger regulatory framework than currently proposed, to close the
loophole for high-wage employees sustained by the In Re Documents
Technologies Litigation decision. Part VI offers recommended practices in
anticipation of proposed legislation.
I. ENFORCEMENT OF NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS
THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES
A. WHITE HOUSE AND U.S. TREASURY ATTITUDES TOWARDS
NONCOMPETES
In 2016, nearly forty percent of Americans had signed noncompetition
agreements. 14 Within this percentage, low-wage employees are increasingly
subject to restrictive noncompetes as more low-wage employers adopt
noncompete agreements during the hiring process. 15 As a result of this
growth, noncompetition agreements are currently facing greater scrutiny by

12. A garden leave refers to a period in which an employee is no longer employed by his or
her previous employer, who may continue to make payments to the employee, but is restrained
from working for a competing employer. Galler, supra note 5, at 5; See infra notes 74–82 and
accompanying text.
13. In re Document Techs. Litig., 275 F. Supp. 3d at 459.
14. Duarte Geraldino, What You Should Know About Noncompete Agreements, PBS (July 14,
2016, 6:11 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/know-non-compete-agreements/.
15. Press Release, Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman, A.G. Schneiderman Proposes
Nation’s Most Comprehensive Bill To Curb Widespread Misuse Of Non-Compete Agreements
(Oct. 25, 2016).
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both federal and local governments across the board. 16 In the same year,
both the White House—under the Obama administration—and the U.S.
Treasury issued separate reports expressing skepticism of the use of
noncompetition agreements and offered recommendations to limit their
use. 17 In its report, the White House found that while noncompetition
agreements may be beneficial when used in a limited fashion, they can also
“reduce the welfare of workers and hamper the efficiency of the economy
as a whole by depressing wages, limiting mobility and inhibiting
motivation.” 18 This finding is based upon the premise that the bargaining
power of employees is significantly reduced when a noncompete agreement
is signed. 19 When an employee signs such an agreement, it legally prevents
the employee from accepting a competitor’s offer, decreasing the
employee’s leverage during wage negotiations and limits the employee’s
opportunities for career development with other potential employers. 20
Additionally, the White House’s report emphasizes that broad geographic
and time scope limitations of noncompete agreements harm both employees
and “the overall efficiency of labor markets” because low-wage employees
may ultimately lack necessary skills in applying for other jobs if they are
prevented from seeking related employment for a certain amount of time. 21
This deficiency of essential skills would also weaken such employees’
“labor force attachment,” or an employee’s desire and ability to remain an
active participant in the labor market, 22 and consequently the country’s
labor market altogether. 23
The U.S. Treasury expressed similar sentiments in its report, finding
that trade secret protection does not necessarily justify a widespread use of
noncompete clauses. 24 The report also found that noncompetes are less
likely to produce social benefits since they are often used by employers in a
“non-transparent” way and that noncompetes are common among
employees who have a lower rate of actually possessing trade secrets. 25 To
support its skepticism of noncompete agreements, the U.S. Treasury cited
16. David S. Almeling & Tony Beasley, The Shifting Junction Of Trade Secret Law And
Noncompetes, LAW360 (Aug. 17, 2016, 11:36 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/828395
/the-shifting-junction-of-trade-secret-law-and-noncompetes.
17. Id.
18. OBAMA WHITE HOUSE, NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF THE USAGE,
POTENTIAL ISSUES, AND STATE RESPONSES 5 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse
.archives.gov/sites/default/files/non-competes_report_final2.pdf.
19. Id. at 6.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 7.
22. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HOW THE GOVERNMENT
MEASURES UNEMPLOYMENT 5 (2014), https://www.bls.gov/cps/cps_htgm.pdf.
23. OBAMA WHITE HOUSE, supra note 18, at 7.
24. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., OFF. OF ECON. POL’Y, NON-COMPETE CONTRACTS:
ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 11 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/economic-policy/Documents/UST%20Non-competes%20Report.pdf.
25. Id. at 4.
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an experiment showing that when Michigan made noncompetes enforceable
in 1985, the state faced an eight percent decrease in job mobility. 26 The
report suggests that there is a correlation between stricter enforcement of
noncompetes and both lower wage growth and lower initial wages, finding
that “a standard deviation in noncompete enforcement reduces wages by
about 1.4 percent.” 27 In conclusion, the report offers policy-making
recommendations to prevent such halts in wage growth and to encourage
job mobility, including “requiring employers to highlight the implications
of noncompetes on future mobility for workers at the outset of the
relationship,” “encouraging employers to use noncompetes that are
enforceable and requiring states to make the conditions of enforceability as
explicit as possible,” and “requiring employers to provide additional
consideration to employees subject to noncompetes.” 28
B. STATE ATTITUDES TOWARDS NONCOMPETES
In recent years, several states have enacted legislation that restricts the
enforceability of noncompetition agreements within their respective
boundaries. 29 However, these states remain as the minority that have
increased restrictions toward noncompetition agreements. 30 For example,
Section 1660 of the California Business and Professions Code has remained
substantially the same as it was in 1872 31 and now prevents, with few
exceptions, “[e]very contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging
in a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind.” 32 In 2015, Hawaii
enacted a law banning noncompetition agreements mostly relating to
“technology businesses.” 33 In April 2016, Utah enacted a law in which
noncompetes may not apply for longer than one year. 34 The law explicitly
excludes “reasonable severance agreement[s]” in its list of potentially
voidable restrictive covenants affecting post-employment. 35 Oregon, in
January 2016, revised its statutes to provide that noncompetition
agreements are voidable unless an employer has a “protectable interest,”
such as when an employee has access to trade secrets or to “competitively
sensitive confidential business or professional information that otherwise
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Almeling & Beasley, supra note 16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (Deering 1941).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-4 (2015).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-51-201 (LexisNexis 2016).
Id. In 2018, Utah amended § 34-51-201, which no longer excludes “reasonable severance
agreement[s].” However, the law now has specific restrictions on post-employment restrictive
covenants between a broadcasting company and a broadcasting employee. UTAH CODE ANN. §
34-51-201 (LexisNexis 2018).
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would not qualify as a trade secret, including product development plans,
product launch plans, marketing strategy or sales plans.” 36 The revised
statute also places an eighteen-month cap on the noncompete period
following an employee’s termination. 37 Also in January 2016, Alabama
narrowed its previous laws on noncompetition agreements. 38 The amended
law now provides that “[e]very contract by which anyone is restrained from
exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind otherwise than
is provided by this section is to that extent void.” 39 Of course, there are
exceptions including that “reasonable restraints on time and place” may be
placed on the ability of an employee to work for another “similar business”
in a “specified geographic area.”40 Most recently in August 2018, the
Massachusetts legislature passed the Massachusetts Noncompetition
Agreement Act (the “Act”) regulating the use and enforcement of
noncompetes in the private sector.41 The Act requires the payment of
garden leave pay or “other mutually agreed upon consideration,” advance
notice of noncompetes to employees, and additional consideration for
noncompetes entered into after the commencement of employment. 42
Additionally, the Act holds that noncompetes are unenforceable against
employees eighteen years old and under, undergraduate or graduate students
employed as interns, employees terminated without cause, and employees
that are non-exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 43
Despite such legislative responses, a majority of states openly enforce
noncompetition agreements for employees of all income brackets, and many
lack restrictions regarding geographic or time-related limitations of such
agreements. 44 Idaho was recognized in 2016 as one of the most difficult
places in the country for an employee to leave an employer for a better
opportunity elsewhere. 45 In 2016, Idaho passed legislation that strengthened
noncompetition agreements in favor of employers. 46 Under the law, if a
court found that a “key employee” or “key independent contractor”
breached a noncompetition agreement with his or her employer, it was
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (2016).
Id.
Almeling & Beasley, supra note 16.
ALA. CODE § 8-1-190 (LexisNexis 2016).
Id.
Erik J. Winton & Colin A. Thakkar, Massachusetts Legislature (Finally) Passes NonCompete Law, JACKSON LEWIS P.C. (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.jacksonlewis.com/publication/
massachusetts-legislature-finally-passes-non-compete-law.
42. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 24L (West 2018).
43. Id.
44. Burke, supra note 3.
45. See Conor Dougherty, Noncompete Pacts, Under Siege, Find Haven in Idaho, N. Y. TIMES
(July 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/14/business/economy/boise-idaho-noncompet
e-law.html.
46. The new law is particularly strict because it now places a burden on employees to prove
that they will not harm their former employer by taking a new job. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 442704 (West 2018).
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presumed that the employee’s departure would cause “irreparable harm” to
that employer. 47 In order to argue against this presumption, the employee
would have had to “show that the key employee or key independent
contractor ha[d] no ability to adversely affect the employer’s legitimate
business interests.” 48 Fortunately in 2018, Idaho repealed the rebuttable
presumption of irreparable harm for departures of “key employees,” shifting
the burden of establishing the likelihood of irreparable harm for all former
employees back on the employer. 49 Florida is another state where
noncompetition agreements are freely enforced under statutory and case
law. 50 Generally, noncompetition agreements in Florida will be enforced
“so long as such contracts are reasonable in time, area, and line of
business.” 51
Compared to other areas of labor and employment law, law directed at
noncompete agreements has remained relatively static with most changes
resulting from court decisions concerning specific circumstances.52 There is
no federal law governing noncompetition agreements, and each state in the
country has its own governing law on these agreements. 53 While
noncompetition agreements may be of high interest to federal government
contractors that repeatedly compete against the same businesses, all
noncompetition agreements remain subject to individual state employment
laws. 54 As previously noted, many state legislatures have recently begun to
focus their attention on how noncompetition agreements are utilized and
enforced.55 Due to this increased skepticism, employers face greater
challenges in drafting enforceable noncompetition agreements. 56 It is
crucial that employers remain informed of this changing area of law to
ensure that employment contracts are updated to adapt to new
developments. 57 Inability to enforce noncompete agreements can be
devastating and costly to companies as employers. 58 Of course, New York
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Kevin Burns & Brian Ellixson, The Latest on State-Level Noncompete Reform, LAW360

(June 11, 2018, 12:19 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1050708/the-latest-on-state-levelnoncompete-reform.
50. J.J. Prescott et al., Understanding Noncompetition Agreements: The 2014 Noncompete
Survey Project, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 369, 370, 459 (2016).
51. See FLA. STAT. § 542.335 (2017).
52. James Hammerschmidt & Jack Blum, Noncompete Agreements Under Siege At The State
Level, LAW360 (May 25, 2017, 12:17 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles
/926364/noncompete-agreements-under-siege-at-the-state-level.
53. Geraldino, supra note 14.
54. 2 Henry L. Goldberg, Fed. Contract Mgmt. (MB) ¶ 10.13 (2018).
55. See Hammerschmidt & Blum, supra note 52.
56. Jyotin Hamid & Tricia Sherno, Restrictive Covenants Under New York Law: The Court of
Appeals Weights in on Choice of Law Provisions and Partial Enforcement, 33 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 275, 275 (2016).
57. Hammerschmidt & Blum, supra note 52.
58. Id.
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has its own take on restrictions to and the enforceability of noncompetition
agreements.
II. NEW YORK NONCOMPETE LAW AND RECENT ACTIVITY
In New York, there is no state statutory authority that generally governs
noncompetition agreements in employment. 59 Use of noncompetition
agreements within specific industries and sectors in New York is governed
by industry-related statutes or regulations. 60 For example the legal industry
is governed by Rule 5.6 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct,
the financial industry is governed by Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (“FINRA”) Rules 2140 and 11870, and the broadcasting industry
is governed by Section 202-k of the New York Labor Law. 61
Overall, New York tends to disfavor noncompetition agreements as
unreasonable restraints on trade. 62 As a general rule, restrictive agreements
entered into voluntarily will be enforced when it is “reasonable in time and
area, necessary to protect an employer’s legitimate interests, not harmful to
the general public and not unreasonably burdensome to the employee.” 63 Of
course, determination of the enforceability of a restrictive agreement is a
“case-specific inquiry.” 64 As part of this inquiry, courts may consider the
“standard restrictive covenants in the applicable industry, the rate of
developments and changes in the technology of that industry, and the
geographic reach of the employer.” 65 Additionally, New York courts can
and will “blue pencil” an agreement if it finds provisions to be
unenforceable. 66 Blue penciling enables a court to remove such provisions
from a noncompete while allowing remaining provisions to be enforced. 67
During employment, employees in New York cannot compete with
their employer because they have a “duty of loyalty” to their employer. 68
59. SCOTT J. WENNER, NON-COMPETE LAWS: NEW YORK, PRACTICAL LAW STATE Q&A,
RESOURCE ID 5-504-6806, PRACTICAL LAW LABOR & EMPLOYMENT, at 2 (database updated July
6, 2018).
60. Id. at 2–3.
61. Id. at 3. Attorneys cannot offer or make agreements that restrict them from practicing law
after terminating an employment relationship, except for agreements regarding retirement
benefits. Id. at 2. Under FINRA, a noncompete is not enforceable if it would prevent a customer
from continuing use of services of its registered representative if such representative terminates
employment of one FINRA member firm to join another. Id. at 3; An employer in the
broadcasting industry cannot require, as an employment condition, that an employee enter into a
post-employment noncompete agreement prohibiting the employee from working “in a specific
geographic area . . . for a specified period of time . . . with a particular employer or industry,”
although a noncompete provision will be enforced if it only covers the contract term. Id.
62. See Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 307 (1976).
63. Id.
64. See USI Ins. Servs. LLC v. Miner, 801 F. Supp. 2d 175, 188–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
65. Galler, supra note 5, at 3.
66. See BDO Seidman v. Hirschberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382, 395 (1999).
67. Galler, supra note 5, at 3.
68. WENNER, supra note 59, at 10.
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Under this duty, employees must “exercise the utmost good faith, loyalty
and obedience during the employment term.” 69 This duty ends when the
employment relationship ends, but employees are still required to keep an
employer’s trade secrets and classified information confidential.70 Where an
employee does not exercise good faith, such as when an employee removes
an employer’s confidential information or trade secrets before leaving a
company, a court may enforce a noncompetition provision to protect the
employer’s interests. 71 An employer may invoke the “inevitable disclosure”
doctrine when seeking an injunction to enforce a noncompete. 72 Under this
doctrine, an employer can seek an injunction on the basis that a former
employee, who is now working for a direct competitor that provides the
same or very similar products or services, had access to trade secrets and
“could not reasonably be expected to fulfill [his or her] new job
responsibilities without utilizing the trade secrets of [his or her] former
employer.” 73
New York courts, in deciding whether a noncompetition agreement is
enforceable, may also consider whether an employer will make payments to
an employee for a period of “garden leave,” which is the period in which an
employee is no longer employed by his or her previous employer but is
restrained from working for a competing employer. 74 Courts are much less
likely to find a noncompetition agreement to be enforceable if the
restriction would leave the employee without compensation from his or her
former employer and without the ability to receive compensation in his or
her respective field. 75 Garden leaves, which originated in the United
Kingdom, are mostly used for higher level employees in the financial
services industry, but are increasingly being used in other sectors. 76 Garden
leaves are typically provided in lieu of noncompetition agreements because
they provide some of the same benefits of noncompetition agreements,
without challenges that employers frequently face when enforcing
noncompetition agreements. 77 With a garden leave, an employee continues
to receive compensation while the employee “tends to his or her garden.”78
69. Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 117 N.E.2d 237, 245 (1954).
70. WENNER, supra note 59, at 10.
71. See, e.g., Ayco Co. v. Frisch, 795 F. Supp. 2d 193, 209–10 (N.D.N.Y. 2011); Ayco Co. v.

Feldman, No. 1:10-CV-1213, 2010 WL 4286154, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2010).
72. Galler, supra note 5, at 4.
73. EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, 2000 WL
1093320 (2d Cir. May 18, 2000).
74. Galler, supra note 5, at 5.
75. Id.
76. Charles A. Sullivan, Tending the Garden: Restricting Competition via “Garden Leave,” 37
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 293, 294 (2016).
77. Jeffrey S. Klein & Nichols J. Pappas, ‘Garden Leave’ Clauses in Lieu of Non-Competes,
241 N.Y.L.J. 1 (2009).
78. CHRISTOPHER K. RAMSEY & SARAH ANDREWS, XPERTHR EMP. LAW MANUAL 2655,
EMPLOYEE LEAVES, OTHER LEAVES (2015).
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Throughout a garden leave, an employee is technically employed and is
paid salary and benefits, but does not provide any services to the
employer. 79 Unlike noncompetes, garden leaves are in force during the
employment relationship rather than after the employment relationship
ends. 80 Garden leaves are usually agreed upon and included as a clause in
an employment agreement when an employee is first hired. 81 There are no
federal or state laws that address garden leave; however, an employer must
ensure that a garden leave policy is carefully drafted to avoid nullification
as an unlawful noncompete agreement under applicable state law.82
New York courts may also consider the circumstances surrounding an
employee’s termination in analyzing the enforceability of a noncompetition
agreement. 83 Under the employee choice doctrine, New York courts will
consider a noncompetition agreement as a contract and will not inquire as to
the reasonableness of the agreement where an employee voluntarily
terminates employment and the employer conditions the employee’s
“receipt of postemployment benefits upon [the employee’s] compliance”
with the noncompetition agreement. 84 In this situation, the employee has a
choice to either comply and receive benefits (e.g., severance, equity awards,
or deferred compensation) or actually work for a competitor and forfeit the
benefits. 85 The employee choice doctrine does not apply when an employee
is involuntarily terminated without cause. 86 In such a scenario, a court must
determine whether forfeiture is reasonable. 87
A. RECENT CASE LAW
New York courts have employed these rules and standards in several
recent cases. 88 In 2010, the Northern District of New York granted motions
for preliminary injunctive relief to an employer who sought enforcement of
noncompetition agreements against employees who allegedly took
confidential information of the employer before departing from the
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Klein & Pappas, supra note 77.
RAMSEY & ANDREWS, supra note 78.
Galler, supra note 5, at 5.
Morris v. Schroder Capital Mgt. Int’l, 7 N.Y.3d 616, 620–21 (2006).
Id. at 621.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Morris v. Schroder Capital Mgt. Int’l, 7 N.Y.3d 616, 620–21 (2006) (recognizing
the “employee choice” doctrine); Ayco Co. v. Frisch, 795 F. Supp. 2d 193, 210 (N.D.N.Y. 2011)
(finding that “[a]bsent injunctive relief, [the employer was] threatened with imminent,
irretrievable disclosure to competitors of confidential information”); Ayco Co. v. Feldman, No.
1:10-CV-1213, 2010 WL 4286154, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2010) (finding that the loss of
confidential customer information resulted in irreparable harm to the employer); Int’l Bus.
Machines Corp. v. Visentin, No. 11 Civ. 399, 2011 WL 672025, at *21–22 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16,
2011) (recognizing that noncompetition agreements are enforceable to protect an employer’s
legitimate business interest, which includes trade secrets and confidential information).
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company. 89 The court enjoined the employees from working for any
competitor of the company for ninety days and from disclosing the
confidential information that had been taken.90 More recently, in 2011, the
Southern District of New York denied a request made by IBM for a
preliminary injunction to enforce a twelve-month noncompetition
agreement against an executive manager who left to work for a
competitor. 91 The court rejected IBM’s contention that by signing the
noncompete, the employee had agreed that his non-compliance with the
agreement would cause irreparable harm to his employer. 92 The court
further found that IBM’s contention that court intervention was imperative
to protect its information from disclosure was undermined by the fact that
other employees who had access to some of the same information were not
required to sign noncompetition agreements. 93 Since the employee’s skills
were neither “unique or extraordinary” and he did not possess any trade
secrets or confidential information, the court ruled that the non-competition
agreement was not imperative to protect a legitimate interest of the
employer. 94 It certainly did not help IBM’s case that its own witness even
testified that the real purpose of the noncompetition agreement was to serve
as an employee “retention device” rather than a tool to protect the
company’s trade secrets. 95 The court finally noted that undue hardship
would be imposed on the employee if the noncompetition agreement was
enforced because it was uncertain that the competitor’s offer would be
available at the end of the twelve-month restriction period, even though the
employee would receive twelve months of salary from IBM. 96
B. RECENT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Both New York State and New York City legislatures have recently
followed the footsteps of other states in turning their attention further
towards noncompetition agreements. 97 In July 2017, the New York City
Council proposed legislation “prohibiting New York City employers from
[using noncompetition agreements] with any low-wage employee.” 98 The
proposed legislation defines “low-wage employee” as “a clerical and other

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Frisch, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 210; Feldman, 2010 WL 4286154, at *12.
Frisch, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 210; Feldman, 2010 WL 4286154, at *12.
Visentin, 2011 WL 672025, at *2–3.
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Id. at *5, *10.
Id. at *21–22.
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worker as defined in subdivision 7 of section 190 of the labor law,” 99 which
essentially means “any non-exempt employee, other than manual workers,
railroad workers, or commission salespersons.” 100 To be an exempt
employee under the New York Labor Law, the employee “must be
employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity
and receive earnings in excess of $900 per week.” 101 If adopted, New York
City employers would also be prohibited from requiring potential
employees that are not “low-wage employees” to enter into noncompetition
agreements unless the employer discloses, in writing, at the beginning of
the hiring process that the prospective employee may be subject to such
agreement. 102
In October 2016, former New York Attorney General Eric T.
Schneiderman announced that he would propose a bill in New York that
closely mirrors the New York City proposed legislation. 103 The bill, which
is slightly more restrictive than the New York City proposed legislation,
would prohibit the use of noncompetition agreements for employees that sit
below the salary line put in place by Labor Law Section 190(7) of $900 per
week, as well as agreements that are “broader than needed to protect [an]
employer’s trade secrets or confidential information.” 104 Additionally, it
would require employers to provide such agreements prior to extending an
offer and to pay employees additional “consideration” if non-competition
agreements are signed by the employee. 105 Finally, the bill would limit the
allowable time duration for these agreements and create a “private right of
action with remedies including liquidated damages for violations.” 106
Schneiderman stated that “workers should be able to get a new job and
improve their lives without being afraid of being sued by their current or
former employer . . . my proposed bill will protect workers’ rights to seek
new and better opportunities, particularly low-wage workers who have been
locked into minimum wage jobs due to non-competes. It will also ensure
that businesses can hire the best workers for the job.” 107
Former New York Attorney General Schneiderman’s proposed
legislation results largely from several investigations performed in recent
years into the use of noncompetition agreements of companies operating in
New York, including investigations of the Jimmy John’s Franchise and
99. N.Y. City Council, Int. No. 1663-2017 (introduced July 20, 2017), available at
https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3106790&GUID=CF72C6E8-ED15493A-85FF-AAE26C72EEE6 [hereinafter Int. No. 1663-2017].
100. Klein, supra note 1.
101. Id.
102. Int. No. 1663-2017, supra note 99.
103. Klein, supra note 1.
104. Press Release, Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman, supra note 15.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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Law360. 108 In late 2014, Schneiderman began his investigation into the use
of noncompetition agreements by Jimmy John’s Franchise in New York. 109
The agreements used by Jimmy John’s prohibited employees during their
employment and for two years post-employment from working for any
other businesses that sell sandwiches within two miles of any Jimmy John’s
location in the United States. 110 Schneiderman announced in 2016 that
Jimmy John’s would not enforce such agreements signed by low-wage
employees, explicitly stating that noncompetition agreements for low-wage
workers are unlawful under New York law. 111 The Jimmy John’s settlement
was announced only days after Law360 agreed to stop using its own
noncompetition agreements following Schneiderman’s investigation
therein. 112
In late 2015, Schneiderman’s office began an investigation into the use
of noncompetition agreements by Law360. 113 The agreements used by
Law360 barred editorial employees from working for any direct competitor
in the legal news and data industry for one year after terminating
employment with Law360. 114 Although Law360 claimed it took steps to
enforce agreements in a narrow and “limited manner designed to protect its
competitive interests,” Schneiderman ultimately found the agreements
overly broad and contrary to New York law, which allows employers to use
noncompetition agreements only in very limited circumstances, such as to
protect trade secrets or if such an agreement covers an employee with
special skills. 115 The former New York Attorney General even went so far
as to say that “unscrupulous noncompete agreements,” such as those used
by Law360, can serve as a “veiled threat” to prospective employers who
may be hesitant to offer employment to prospective employees with
existing noncompetition agreements. 116
In July 2018, current New York Attorney General Barbara Underwood
joined ten other attorneys general from California, the District of Columbia,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island in sending a letter to eight fast-food
franchises requesting the franchises to provide documents on noncompete

108. Id.
109. Jessica Corso, Jimmy John’s Nixes NY Noncompetes In Agreement With AG, LAW360

(June 22, 2016, 7:52 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/809676/jimmy-john-s-nixes-nynoncompetes-in-agreement-with-ag.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Vin Gurrieri, Law360 Reaches Noncompete Settlement with NY AG, LAW360 (June 15,
2016, 9:16 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/807290.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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clauses in their contracts. 117 The letter, which addressed fast-food giants
Arby’s, Burger King, Dunkin’ Donuts, Five Guys Burgers and Fries, Little
Caesars, Panera Bread, Popeyes Louisiana Kitchen, and Wendy’s, cited to a
study which found that 80% of fast food restaurants use noncompete
clauses and raised the concerns of the attorneys general about fairness for
low-wage employees. 118
III.

IN RE DOCUMENT TECHNOLOGIES LITIGATION

In July 2017, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, in In re Document Technologies Litigation, denied an
employer’s motion for a preliminary injunction seeking enforcement of
noncompetition and non-solicitation agreements against former
employees. 119 In this case, Document Technologies, Inc. (“DTI”) had
acquired Epiq eDiscovery Solutions, Inc. (“Epiq”) and continued operating
Epiq as a wholly owned subsidiary. 120 As part of its employment procedure,
Epiq had required employees to sign employment agreements that included
a one-year noncompetition agreement. 121 One of the defendants in the case
had been contacted by a recruiter pertaining to an employment opportunity
at LDiscovery, LLC (“LDiscovery”), a competitor of Epiq.122 The same
defendant then shared this information with the rest of the defendants.123
Following negotiations, defendants terminated their employment with Epiq
and executed employment agreements with LDiscovery, 124 which stated
that they would not work for LDiscovery for one year, but would be paid
signing bonuses between $1,200,000 and $1,400,000 in return for this
delay. 125 LDiscovery additionally agreed to indemnify the new employees
for attorneys’ fees and any damages relating to their transition from Epiq to
LDiscovery. 126
DTI argued that the defendants breached the terms of their
noncompetition agreements by entering into employment agreements with
LDiscovery 127 and discussing strategies once they were actively employed
by LDiscovery. 128 The district court ultimately rejected this argument,
holding that a “former employee may prepare to compete during the term of
117. Mike Curley, State AGs Take Aim At Fast Food Noncompete Clauses, LAW360 (July 9,
2018 4:09 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1061177/state-ags-take-aim-at-fast-foodnoncompete-clauses.
118. Id.
119. In re Document Techs. Litig., 275 F. Supp. 3d 454, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
120. Id. at 458.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Klein, supra note 1.
125. In re Document Techs. Litig., 275 F. Supp. 3d at 459.
126. Id.
127. Klein, supra note 1.
128. In re Document Techs. Litig., 275 F. Supp. 3d at 464.
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a non-competition provision . . . .” 129 The court found that legitimate
preparatory acts include “incorporating a future competing business,
constructing facilities, and filing and obtaining trademarks.” 130 The court
explicitly stated that acts are no longer preparatory when they
“detrimentally impact the former employer’s economic interests” during the
period of the noncompetition agreement. 131 According to the court, the
defendants did not detrimentally impact their former employer’s economic
interests because their acts were merely preparatory. 132
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF IN RE DOCUMENT TECHNOLOGIES
LITIGATION AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION IN NEW YORK
A. IMPLICATIONS OF IN RE DOCUMENT TECHNOLOGIES LITIGATION
Prior to the proposed legislation in New York State and New York
City, and the district court’s decision in In re Document Technologies
Litigation, New York had stricter restrictions on the enforcement of
noncompetition agreements than other states. 133 Nonetheless, In re
Document Technologies Litigation demonstrates that New York courts are
likely to scrutinize noncompetition agreements even closer.134 However, it
appears that New York courts will still find noncompetes to be valid in
certain circumstances, such as when garden leave is provided to an
employee, as was provided in In re Document Technologies Litigation.
Although it seems that New York is following in the footsteps of the
minority of states increasing restrictions on employers’ use of noncompetition agreements, the proposed legislation and the district court’s
decision still allow for employers to enforce noncompetition agreements
with high-wage employees. Since the legislation has not yet passed, it was
ultimately up to the district court to make a move towards increasing
restrictions on all noncompetition agreements in New York. In holding that
preparatory acts of the former employees of Epiq did not violate their
noncompetition agreement obligations, the district court in In re Document
Technologies Litigation acted consistently with the goals of current New
York noncompetition law and the proposed New York City and New York
State legislation in maximizing the flexibility of employees generally.
However, the district court, in finding that the employees did not violate
their agreements by merely entering into employment with LDiscovery
because their new employment relationships provided for a garden leave,
lost its chance to further promote the goals of New York noncompete law.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
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The court incorrectly decided the case because the court allowed for the
avoidance of noncompetition agreements for high-wage employees only
through a major loophole: allowing employers to hire an employee with an
existing noncompetition agreement and having such employee take a
garden leave as to not violate the pre-existing agreement. Of course, this
loophole is beneficial to employees that are able to find employers willing
to provide such accommodations and to companies that have the funds to
do so. Unfortunately, this loophole also creates unfair competition since the
only way for a competing business to hire a high-wage employee with a
pre-existing noncompetition agreement, without violating said agreement, is
to provide incentives, such as a million-dollar sign-on bonus. While it may
be likely that a company looking to hire a high-wage employee that is
subject to an existing noncompetition agreement will have the funds to
provide such incentives, not all companies will be able to do so.
In order to provide for garden leave, an employer must “incur real
additional costs.” 135 As a result, when an employer offers such leave,
employers expect advantages justifying these additional costs. 136 This
means that an employer must have the ability, specifically the financial
capital, to provide an employee subject to an existing noncompetition
agreement with significant compensation in order to avoid violating such
agreement during the hiring process. Additionally, these prospective
employees will likely be held to higher standards and pressures by the new
employer as a result of the risk that the employer is taking in providing
garden leave and monetary incentive. Thus, employees may hesitate in
seeking new employment or leaving their current employer because of this
higher standard that may be imposed upon them, if they are even lucky
enough to receive an offer with such monetary incentives. Due to these
various costs, only certain types of employers can provide prospective highwage employees with an escape plan out of an existing noncompetition
agreement. While most employers that offer these incentives happen to be
in the financial industry, 137 and thus have more resources than other
businesses, this creates an unfair advantage for the limited number of
businesses that have the ability to get around noncompetition agreements
when hiring high-wage employees from competitors. Any business that
lacks the capital to provide for incentives, which may include small
businesses and “start-ups” that often employ certain high-wage employees
to help the business grow, will be unable to avoid violations of
noncompetition agreements because they are unable to provide for garden
leaves during the limitation period of the existing agreements. If New York
truly seeks to become a leading pioneer in restricting noncompetition
135. Sullivan, supra note 76, at 303.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 294.
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agreements like California, the district court in In re Document
Technologies Litigation should have found that compelling an employee to
take a garden leave to avoid noncompetition agreement violations is an
unnecessary step in avoiding liability. Rather, the district court should have
held that the noncompetition agreements were completely void. Even in the
face of proposed legislation, the district judge would be safe from
accusations of writing law because such a decision would still meet the
legislature’s goal of optimizing job mobility and protecting employees.
B. LOST CHANCES TO CLARIFY NEW YORK RESTRICTIONS ON
NONCOMPETES
The New York County Supreme Court almost had the chance to
provide additional opinions on restrictions to noncompete agreements prior
to the dismissal of a complaint by L’Oréal USA, Inc. (“L’Oréal”) against
Shiseido Americas Corp. (“Shiseido”). 138 L’Oréal accused a cosmetics
competitor, Shiseido, of stealing an executive along with confidential
information and persuading him to disobey the noncompetition agreement
he signed when he ended his employment relationship with L’Oréal. 139 In
its complaint, L’Oréal claimed that a senior vice president who helped
design the company’s business plans resigned in June 2017 and agreed to
wait until December 2017 to begin his employment, in a similar capacity, at
Shiseido. 140 Although L’Oréal continued to pay the executive his salary
during a garden leave, he informed L’Oréal that he would be traveling to
Tokyo for a couple of weeks in October 2017 to discuss business plans with
Shiseido. 141 This was months ahead of the agreed-upon December 2017
start date. 142 L’Oréal claimed that the executive backed out of the original
agreement because he was prompted by Shiseido, which promised to
provide him with legal advice and defend him from any suit resulting from
the breach of said agreement.143 Specifically, L’Oréal alleged that “Shiseido
[was] facilitating, aiding and abetting [the executive’s] breach of contract,
interfering with [his] contractual obligations to L’Oréal, and ratifying and
accepting the benefit of this wrongful conduct.” 144 L’Oréal believed that the
point of the executive’s planned meetings in Tokyo was to start work on a
“highly sensitive project” for Shiseido, in which Shiseido “hoped to regain
138. Stipulation of Dismissal With Prejudice at 1–2, L’Oréal USA, Inc. v. Shisiedo Am. Corp.
et al., No. 656520-2017 (July 13, 2018).
139. Kat Greene, L’Oréal Says Shiseido Prompted Ex-VP To Violate Noncompete, LAW360
(Oct. 24, 2017, 10:33 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/978060/l-oreal-says-shiseidoprompted-ex-vp-to-violate-noncompete.
140. Complaint at 2–6, L’Oréal USA, Inc. v. Shiseido Am. Corp. et al., No. 656520-2017 (Oct.
24, 2017).
141. Id. at 5–6.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 6.
144. Id.
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commercial momentum that it lost to L’Oréal.” 145 L’Oréal emphasized that
it had made “major investments” in what it promised to be a “major
development” in the cosmetics industry, demonstrating the importance of
the sensitive project. 146
This would have been at least the second suit in two years against
Shiseido accusing the company of poaching high-level executives in the
beauty industry. 147 In 2016, Coty Inc. (“Coty”), a beauty products company,
sued in New York County Supreme Court, claiming that two former senior
vice presidents of Coty were induced by Shiseido to resign from the
company with “full knowledge of and utter disregard” for the noncompetes
included in their employment agreements. 148 Coty also believed that its
former president, who is currently CEO of Shiseido, “masterminded a plan
to poach Coty’s top executives in an attempt to disrupt its business and
unfairly gain a competitive edge.” 149 Coty’s suit against Shiseido is also
currently pending. 150 Coty also sued Shiseido in November 2015 for
poaching its former chief financial officer, but the parties settled in
February 2016. 151 It is unfortunate, at least for the purpose of clarifying
noncompete restrictions, that L’Oréal’s suit was dismissed by stipulation of
the parties since it appeared that the L’Oréal executive was provided with a
garden leave, and he violated both that provision and the noncompete
provisions of his departure agreement.
V. SOLUTION
Since the district court allowed employees in In re Document
Technologies Litigation to escape violations of their noncompetition
agreements through use of a garden leave provided by their new employer,
New York State and New York City legislatures must now review and
revise the proposed legislation in order to fully maximize employee
flexibility. Limiting enforcement of noncompetition agreements of lowwage employees is of particular importance because the number of lowwage jobs throughout the country is expected to grow the fastest through
2022. 152 However, legislatures need to include restrictions on the use of
noncompetition agreements for low-wage and high-wage employees in
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
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order to establish consistency and maintain a fair employment standard
throughout the entire state and to keep a strong and stable labor market
across the nation. The legislatures must also consider the consequences that
this legislation may have on the work environment of New York and should
pay attention to other states that have already implemented or are
considering increased restrictions on the enforceability of noncompetition
agreements or completely banning their use altogether.
While low-wage jobs are expected to increase, the fastest growing
professions throughout the country are higher-paying jobs in science,
technology, engineering, and math. 153 Startups, which frequently do
business in these areas, are popping up increasingly in New York. 154 While
California is known as one of the most popular states for startups, New
York, in the first quarter of 2015, had more startup funding applications
than California for the first time ever. 155 Further, New York City is number
two in the amount of venture capital raised by local companies behind San
Francisco. 156 New York is currently attempting to compete with
California’s technology sector. 157 In 2011, former Mayor of New York
Michael Bloomberg invited top universities to bid on the construction of a
new tech campus in New York City. 158 Bloomberg expressed New York
City’s goal of “becoming the global leader in technological innovation,”
and Senator Kirsten Gillibrand has echoed this sentiment, stating that “no
other city is poised to lead in the high-tech economy of the future like New
York City.” 159 In September 2017, Cornell Tech, a new graduate school for
technology on Roosevelt Island, opened its doors. 160 The school’s opening
marks the extension and progress of “Silicon Alley,” New York’s own
version, and competitor, of Silicon Valley in California. 161 In its 2016
report, the U.S. Treasury found that in urban economics, regions are prone
to “agglomeration effects,” in which businesses, such as high-tech firms,
tend to cluster in geographic locations rather than being randomly
located. 162 Silicon Valley is a prime example of this phenomenon and is a
153. Id.
154. Taylor Majewski, How NYC Tech Growth is Outpacing Silicon Valley, BUILT IN NYC
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direct result of the “availability of a large, deep pool of workers with
relevant skills, a more competitive market of suppliers, and information
spillovers across workers and firms.” 163 Without the restriction of
noncompete agreements, the clustering of firms allows for workers to share
expertise much easier, providing an advantage to the larger economy and
making the geographic cluster an attractive location to other businesses.164
In order to fulfill its goal of competing with Silicon Valley and allow for
the growth of its science, technology, engineering, and math markets, New
York should increase restrictions on noncompetes, including those signed
by high-wage employees, so that it may also become prone to the
agglomeration effects that provide for a competitive edge, especially if it
hopes to make Silicon Alley a viable competitor of Silicon Valley.
Although the New York City proposed legislation does in fact touch
upon the enforceability of noncompetition agreements for high-wage
employers, it states only that an employer who wishes to utilize such an
agreement must disclose, in writing, that the prospective employee will be
subject to a noncompetition agreement. 165 The New York City legislature
should adopt language that other states have used in passing law on
noncompetition agreements. While adopting similar language to
California’s statute would be the most effective in restricting all “contract[s]
by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade
or business of any kind,” 166 New York City could also adopt less restrictive
language and follow states such as Hawaii, 167 which would at least protect
employees in the technology sector. The New York City legislature clearly
has a reason for mentioning high-wage employees in its proposed
legislation, but needs to explore the option of making the enforceability of
noncompetes of high-wage employees just as difficult as the enforceability
of agreements used with low-wage employees. Simply requiring a written
disclosure to prospective high-wage employees is ineffective, and this
provision must also be revised, especially since there is a risk that
employees may feel pressured by employers to sign such disclosures in fear
of losing employment opportunities.
The New York State proposed legislation should also heed this advice
since it does not mention high-wage employees at all. If New York State
passed law restricting noncompetition agreements for both low and highwage employees, New York City would not need to pass its own law to
restrict noncompete enforceability. Consistency between the New York
City and State laws would nonetheless be of great value in order to equally
maximize employee flexibility throughout New York State as a whole. In
163.
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the face of recent and increasing litigation with respect to alleged breaches
of noncompete agreements by high-level executives, New York legislatures
must address restrictions on high-wage employees.
Since garden leave provisions are technically separate agreements that
differ from noncompetition agreements, New York State and New York
City will also need to propose and implement separate legislation on the
enforceability of these provisions. It is doubtful that New York State and
New York City will want to restrict garden leave provisions until legislation
is passed and enforced with respect to the enforceability of noncompetition
agreements on low-wage (and hopefully high-wage) employees since they
currently serve as a way to escape noncompetition agreements. Although at
the same time, garden leave provisions serve only as escape routes for the
fraction of high-wage employees who are offered such high monetary
incentives. If the New York legislatures seek to fully protect low-wage
employees, they should also look to restricting garden leave provisions
since low-wage employees are currently at an unfair advantage as they do
not have the option of receiving these benefits. It is likely, however, that
New York will also be hesitant to restrict or even comment on garden leave
provisions due to the fact that there are currently no other federal or state
laws governing garden leaves. 168
Of course, the easiest solution to creating consistent standards
throughout the country is for the federal government to pass legislation
restricting the enforceability of noncompetition agreements throughout the
entire nation. This would likely cause much debate though, especially since
the majority of states currently enforce noncompetition agreements
openly. 169 However, both the White House and the Treasury Department
have expressed clear disfavor of noncompetition agreements. 170 Perhaps
federal law would in fact follow the trend that a minority of states have
established, yet this may also depend on the current control of Congress
since the expression of disfavor towards the use and enforcement of
noncompetes was shared during the Obama administration. 171 The fact that
President Trump has promised to create more blue-collar employment
opportunities 172 may also influence the federal government to consider
legislation, at a minimum, with respect to low-wage employees across the
country.
New York employers in favor of noncompetition agreements may argue
that a complete restriction on the use noncompetition agreements will
inhibit the economy of New York, allowing competitors to poach
employees and leave businesses suffering economic loss. This is especially
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

RAMSEY & ANDREWS, supra note 78.
Burke, supra note 3.
Almeling & Beasley, supra note 16.
Id.
Dougherty, supra note 9.

308

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 13

important for smaller businesses, who may fear that employees, without
noncompete restrictions, may leave for employment with much larger
companies. However, this argument is less than compelling, especially
when one looks at the success of a state like California, a leader in
restricting noncompete agreements, which prohibits the enforcement of
noncompetition agreements against the majority of the employees in the
state. 173 California is one of three states that bans noncompetes outright,
along with North Dakota and Oklahoma, 174 and its economy is currently the
world’s fifth largest economy, rivaling that of the United Kingdom. 175
Additionally, California’s economy grew $42.3 billion during the first three
quarters of 2016, which is almost as much as New York, one of the next
fastest-growing states in the country. 176 According to a U.S. News Ranking,
California also sits as the twenty-ninth best state for employment, while
New York sits at number forty. 177
VI. PRACTICES IN ANTICIPATION OF RESTRICTIONS
In anticipation of legislation that may increase restrictions on the
enforceability of noncompetition agreements in New York, employees must
still carefully prepare to depart from employment, whether they are subject
to an enforceable noncompetition agreement or not. Even in a state like
California, where the employment landscape is supposedly “laissez-faire,”
employees that do not carefully manage career moves can end up in legal
trouble. 178 Regardless of how New York legislatures and courts proceed,
employees must fully read what they actually signed at the beginning of
their employment relationships and comply with what they have signed, at
least initially. 179 Even without the consultation of an attorney, which is not
always feasible especially for low-wage employees, it is important for an
employee to remain mindful of how his or her conduct will look if he or she
is ever brought into court by an employer due to allegations of a breached
noncompete agreement. 180 It is very likely that an employer, upon learning
that an employee is planning to leave or has left to work for a competitor,
173. Hammerschmidt & Blum, supra note 52.
174. Gregory Korte, USA Today White House Launches Crackdown on Non-Compete Clauses,
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will take steps to review the employee’s pre-departure records, including
emails and computer/printer usage, thus an employee should refrain from
any inappropriate actions with respect to his or her departure and new
employment. 181 Additionally, employees should be careful in publicizing
any new employment with a competing business, as any public information
about new employment may trigger concerns of an employee’s former
employer. 182 If any issues arise after departing with an employer to work for
a competing business, of course an employee should contact an attorney
immediately, as ignoring the issue or implementing self-help remedies can
prove to be even more harmful. 183 In the face of a suit for breaching a
noncompete agreement, an employee may be able to “invalidate or reduce
the agreement’s impact.” 184 One possible tactic is for an employee to report
his or her employer to the New York State Attorney General, who may
initiate an investigation into the employer (as was done with Jimmy John’s
and Law360). 185 If an employee does not have highly unique skills acquired
during employment or access to trade secrets, an employee will likely not
be bound by a noncompete agreement and an employer attempting to
enforce such an agreement could be prosecuted for trying to restrict the
employee’s ability to work for another employer. 186 An employee should
also make sure that the employer actually has a copy of the noncompete
agreement—if the company does not have a copy, then it cannot enforce a
noncompete agreement. 187 If the company does have a copy, an employer
should confirm that the employer has itself not breached the employment
agreement in which the noncompete provision is provided. 188 If an
employer has in fact breached any of its obligations to the employee under
the employment agreement, a court will be less inclined to enforce a
noncompete agreement. 189 If an employee’s employment relationship was
terminated involuntarily, an employer may also lack the ability to enforce a
noncompete clause if the employee was fired without cause, as courts
enforce noncompetes only if they are “necessary to protect legitimate
business interests.” 190 Firing an employee and enforcing a noncompete
agreement may also be found to impose “undue hardship” on an employee
and will likely weigh in favor finding a noncompete unenforceable in
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court. 191 As a final tactic, an employee should also support a claim that a
noncompete is unenforceable by arguing there is no competition between
his or her new and former employers. 192 If an employee’s new employer
provides completely different products or services or sits in a totally
different market than his or her previous employer, a noncompete
agreement will likely be found unenforceable by a court.193 Of course, the
employee will have the burden to show that the new employer does in fact
not compete with his or her previous employer. 194 Once the prospective
legislation is passed, hopefully such lengthy procedures will be unnecessary
for employees in fear of violating noncompetes.
Businesses, on the other hand, must also proceed cautiously in drafting
noncompete agreements, especially in the face of increased restrictions on
noncompete enforceability. When drafting noncompete agreements, a
business should consider its desire to restrict employees’ ability to compete
with respect to its legitimate business needs as an employer. 195 Because
courts are most likely to enforce a noncompete agreement that is tailored to
“balance both the business interests of an employer and an employee’s
interests in earning a livelihood in his or her chosen profession,” it is more
important than ever for a business to be extremely specific and reasonable
in drafting a noncompete agreement, especially for low-wage employees. 196
Employers must also be prepared for a court to either nullify or modify any
noncompete agreements it finds unenforceable, as a New York court can
and will delete any provisions that it finds to violate New York employment
law through its power to blue pencil. 197 Ultimately, employers and
businesses in New York should begin to move away from incorporating
noncompetes in employment agreements and, at a minimum, cease
completely from using them when hiring low-wage employees. If, however,
the new legislature remains silent with respect to high-wage employees,
businesses should still remain hesitant in utilizing noncompetes but may
still use garden leaves to avoid violating such agreements, even if they are
quite an unfair advantage, provided that such an employee is of high value
to the business and the business has the funds to supply these considerable
benefits.
CONCLUSION
As noncompete agreements are increasingly a subject of litigation, New
York State and New York City legislatures must revise their proposed
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legislation to include restrictions on the use of noncompetition agreements
with respect to both low-wage and high-wage employees. If New York
wishes to truly maximize employment flexibility and compete with other
progressive states such as California, this is the most efficient method to
fulfill this goal. Without such revision, the legislation, if passed, would
allow for high-wage employees subject to a noncompete to leave an
employer only through loopholes such as garden leave, as was allowed in In
re Document Technologies and for which there are no federal or state laws.
In anticipation of the legislation, employees must remain careful in
preparing for departure from an employer and employers must pay special
attention when drafting noncompetition agreements.
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